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1. Introduction 
Institutional norms can be represented by the preferences of bureaucrats (civil 
servants, government officials) who make or strongly affect economic policy or 
economic transactions. For example, such norms can be represented by the weights 
assigned to the public well being relative to more selfish interests, represented by the 
probability of remaining in office or by the amount of resources transferred from the 
consumers or producers to the bureaucrats, Epstein and Nitzan (2007), Esteban and 
Ray (2010), Grossman and Helpman (1994), Van Winden (1998). An alternative 
representation of the prevailing norm can be based on the revealed preference of the 
economic agents (government officials, producers and consumers), namely on their 
behavior as manifested in their interaction. For example, such a norm can be 
represented by the costs of interaction with government officials – the costs of 
consumers or producers who engage in economic activity that requires formal or 
informal endorsement by government officials. In many countries, and in particular, 
developing countries, low-level officials reduce the profit of firms by delaying 
different aspects of their operation (producing and selling their products). The firms 
transfer part of their profits, for instance, when paying 'speed money' to enhance their 
business activities and avoid bureaucratic friction or red-tapes, Lui (1985), Kahana 
and Nitzan (2002), Muhkerjee (2005).  In the current study the second representation 
of institutional norms (henceforth 'bureaucracy norms') is adopted. Specifically, we 
assume that bureaucracy norms allow the use of government office for extracting 
resources, Konrad (2009). The bureaucracy norms result in the existence of 
bureaucracy costs. Specifically, an institutional norm is represented by the profit share 
producers are required to give up in order to secure the approval of government 
officials to produce and/or sell their desired quantity of output. In the simplest case 
this 'bureaucracy tax' rate is constant. 
 Market structure can be characterized by the number and  strength of 
consumers and producers, degree of collusion among them, forms of competition and 
ease of entry into and exit from the market. In this study we focus on the number of 
price-taking producers assuming that there is no collusion (among buyers and sellers) 
and that there are many competitive consumers. 
 The main objective of the paper is to propose a simple new model of industry 
size determination. Rather than investigate the extent of bureaucracy costs under 
alternative market structures or how domestic market structure influences the political 
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effectiveness of interest groups, Hillman, Long and  Soubeyran (2001), we examine 
how bureaucracy norms  affect market structure1. In our setting the decision on the 
number of active price-taking firms in an industry is made by government officials. 
The proposed approach is illustrated, first, by focusing on the relationship between the 
number of competitive firms and the existing institutional norm. We then identify the 
bureaucrats' most preferred relationship between industry size and the bureaucracy 
norm (recall that a bureaucracy norm specifies for any level of production the profit 
share transferred from the producer to the bureaucrat). In the proposed model, the 
number of firms is not determined by strategic entry barriers due to collusion among 
the sellers, by technological entry barriers (the different efficiency of the producers), 
by a competitive ideology of the regulator or by the political power of some sub-
group of the producers.  Rather, it is the optimal number for a bureaucrat who is 
interested in enhancing his own interest (maximize his share of the industry profits – 
the total costs of the producers' interaction with him), taking advantage of the existing 
market characteristics as well as the prevailing norm that allows a particular pattern of 
extraction of resources from the producers. If the bureaucrat can control the structural 
relationship between industry size and the institutional norm, then he would choose 
his most preferred relationship between industry size and the function relating 
bureaucracy costs to quantity of output. 
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. In Section 2 we introduce 
the producer's problem, given a particular bureaucracy norm, present the equilibrium 
analysis of the producer's optimal output and identify sustainable or viable norms that 
ensure existence of equilibrium. The study of the relationship between bureaucracy 
norms and industry size is carried out in Section 3. The last section 4 contains a 
summary and some concluding remarks. The proof of all the results is relegated to an 
Appendix.  
 
2. Optimal output and viable bureaucracy norms 
Consider a producer of a certain good whose action, producing and/or selling a certain 
amount x of the good, hinges on the timely agreement of government officials. The 
producer is aware of this limitation as well as of the price of securing the necessary 
                                                 
1 Market structure could be viewed as economic policy. However, this direction is not taken in Persson 
and Tabellini (2000). Our approach also differs from that of Horstmann and Markusen (1992) who 
view market structure as the outcome of plant location decisions.  
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endorsement of the bureaucrats. This price is associated with the efforts invested in 
coping with bureaucratic barriers and the direct and indirect payments that are usually 
involved in obtaining such government approval. One example is the case of quality 
control of the produced output by government inspectors. In other examples,  
producers of some military weapon, intelligence services, classified sophisticated 
technologies etc. face demands for special payments connected with import and 
export licenses or exchange controls. Producing and selling such goods to various 
countries requires the government's endorsement and the producer certainly takes into 
account the share of his profit that has to be transferred to the bureaucrat. This share, 
(1- ( ))G x , is assumed to be non-decreasing in the desirable output level x.2  The 
precise relationship between the residual producer's share, ( )G x , where 
 ( ) 0,1G x  , (0) 1G  and '( ) 0G x   for 0  x  , represents the prevailing 
bureaucracy norm. That is, the function ( )G x  represents the actual effective norm that 
specifies the relationship between the producer's net profit share, and in turn the share 
of resources extracted by the government officials at any given output level. In other 
words, this function is based on the revealed preference of the economic agents (the 
government officials as well as the producers) and on the institutions and culture that 
govern the relationship between these agents. In our setting then the institutional norm  
can be considered as a political-economic environmental constraint that reflects the 
prevailing (equilibrium, steady state or evolutionary stable) behavior of the 
bureaucrats and of the producers in the interaction that determines the accepted 
known necessary price for approval of any output level desired by a producer. This 
means that the net profit of the price-taking producer is: 
 
(1)                                            ( ) ( ) ( )x px c x G x    , 
 
 
Where p is the fixed price of the good and c(x) is a convex cost function 
( '( ) 0c x  and ''( ) 0c x  )3.  
                                                 
2 Whether  (1-G(x)) is  increasing or decreasing in x depends on the strength of the bureaucrat to extract 
resources from the producer relative to the strength of the producer to protect himself from such 
extraction as he gets bigger. In our model we implicitly assume that the difference between the strength 
of the bureaucrat and the strength of the producer increases with x.  
3 Our analysis is still valid when the cost function is linear or even concave. This point is further 
clarified in the remark at the end of this section. 
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The first order condition for an interior solution of the producer's problem, the 
maximization of his profit, is: 
(2)                                '( )  - '( ) ( ) ( ) '( ) 0x p c x G x px c x G x     . 
 
The second order condition for an interior solution of the producer's problem is: 
 
(3)            ''( ) ''( ) ( ) 2 '( ) '( ) ( ) ''( ) 0x c x G x p c x G x px c x G x         . 
   
Notice that under the extreme case where ( ) 1G x  , inequality (3) is satisfied. 
In general, however, this second order condition requires that a certain 
relationship holds between G(x) and c(x) for securing the producer's 
equilibrium. In fact, condition (3) can be used to characterize the necessary 
form of the bureaucracy norm that ensures the existence of an optimal output. 
In other words, it can be used to characterize viable bureaucracy norms - 
norms that are consistent with the existence of a solution to the producer's 
problem. This application of the second order condition yields the following 
result:    
 
Proposition 1: A bureaucracy norm given by G(x) is viable, if it is a constant 
or bounded from above by the hyperbolic function 
1 2
1( )G x
D x D
  , where 
1D and 2D  are constants of integration obtained from the solution of the 
second order differential equation 
2
''( ) '( )2 0
( ) ( )
G x G x
G x G x
        
. 
 
The Appendix contains the proofs of this and all other results. 
 
 Proposition 1 characterizes the set of viable bureaucracy norms. The 
exponential function G(x) = xe  used in the sequel is an example of a viable 
norm.  Proposition 1 implies that 
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Corollary 1.1: Any bureaucracy norm given by the general form 
( )
k
G x
x


     , where 1k   , 2 1D   and 1 1/D   is viable.  
 
Remark: Suppose that the institutional norm is given by a function G(x), that is non-
constant and bounded from above by the hyperbolic function 
1 2
1( )G x
D x D
  . Then 
the convexity of the cost function c(x) is a sufficient, but not a necessary second order 
condition for the maximization of the price-taking producer's problem (the proof of 
this claim is also given in the Appendix). By this claim, the set of cost functions that 
are consistent with the maximization of ( )x  contains the convex functions, but also 
non-convex and, in particular, concave cost functions. In light of Corollary 1.1, the 
claim implies, in particular, that any bureaucracy norm given by ( )
k
G x
x


     , 
where 1k   and 11/ D  ,  allows non-convex and possibly concave cost functions 
that are consistent with the existence of a solution to the producer's problem. The fact 
that in our setting equilibrium may exist even for non-convex technologies that result 
in concave cost functions is of some significance for the comparison between the 
optimal output levels under the benchmark case where ( ) 1 G x   and under other 
cases of viable norms. Let bx  and ax  denote, respectively, the selected output levels 
under the two situations. Then, by application of the first order condition (2), it can be 
shown that under a convex and continuously differentiable cost function, the norm of 
resource extraction in the interaction between a producer and bureaucrats induces the 
former to reduce his output. That is, if c(x) is convex, then a bx x . If c(x) is 
concave, then, again, the bureaucracy norm  induces the producer to reduce his output 
because in such a case ax  is finite, whereas in the benchmark case an interior solution  
bx  does not exist (the producer has an incentive to increase his output infinitely).  
 
3. The size of a regulated competitive industry 
In this study, market structure is characterized by the number of producers, assuming 
that there is no collusion (among buyers and sellers) and that there are many 
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competitive consumers. Let us examine how the prevailing bureaucracy norm, which 
is taken into account in the objective function of the regulator, affects market size.  
Suppose that the norm represented by G(x), which has the general properties 
introduced in the preceding section, is viable and that the bureaucrat's control variable 
can take two forms; (i) The bureaucrat can select the number of identical competitive 
producers, given the cost function, demand function and the existing institutional 
norm (ii) The bureaucrat can select the function that relates the number of producers 
to the norm, given the cost and demand functions. In the latter case, the government 
official is assumed to play a more central role: he can affect the underlying structural 
relationship between market size and the norm of bureaucracy costs. This means that 
his position enables him to influence the norm not only by determining the number of 
producers, but by shaping the relationship between the norm and any number of 
producers. 
 
3.1. Fixed output price 
Let *x  denote the equilibrium output of the producers who face the fixed price p and 
the prevailing norm G(x). Assuming that the second-order condition (3) is satisfied, 
*x is the solution of the first order condition (2).  
 
(i) The preferred market size *n  
Suppose that, anticipating the equilibrium of the producers, the bureaucrat can 
regulate entry to the industry and choose the number of producers n, given G(x), c(x) 
and p. His objective is to maximize the extracted profits from the industry preserving 
the optimality conditions of the producers. The objective function of the bureaucrat is 
therefore given by: 
 
(4)                                * * * *, 1 ( ) ( )U n x n G x px c x      . 
 
Notice that in this case of a perfectly elastic demand, the 
expression  * * *1 ( ) ( )G x px c x    is a constant, so the objective function of the 
bureaucrat is linear in n. This means that   *,U n x  cannot be maximized. In other 
words, in this case, the bureaucrat has an incentive to allow free entry and increase the 
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number of producers infinitely. Alternatively, if n is bounded by n , then the preferred 
market size is *n = n . Regardless of the prevailing norm, the bureaucrat never misses 
an opportunity to increase "income" by allowing exit of any producer.  
 
(ii) The preferred relationship between n  and  G  
Suppose now  that, anticipating the equilibrium of the producers *x , the bureaucrat 
can choose the function ( ( *)n G x  that relates the number of identical competitive 
producers n to the existing institutional norm G( *x ), given p and the cost function 
c(x)4. Again, the objective of the bureaucrat is to maximize his share of the industry 
profits, preserving the optimality conditions of the producers. Being aware of his 
ability to determine the industry size as a function of G( *x ), the objective function of 
the bureaucrat is now given by: 
 
(4')                                 * * * * *( ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )U n G x n G x G x px c x      . 
 
The bureaucrat is looking for the function n(G( *x )) that maximizes this objective 
function, subject to the norm G(x) and the corresponding equilibrium output of the 
producers.  
By (1),  
 
(5)                                            * * **
1( ( )) ( )
( )
px c x x
G x
   . 
 
Substituting (5) in (4), we get that the problem of the bureaucrat is: 
 
(6)                   
( )
 
n G
Max * *1( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )GU n G n G x V G x
G
       , 
 
where ( *)G G x and   
 
                                                 
4 In fact, in this case the government official controls the function  ( *)G x n    that relates  
( *)G x to the number of identical competitive producers n . 
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(7)                                                   
1( ) ( ) GV G n G
G
         . 
 
The first order condition for the solution of this problem is: 
 
(8)                             * * * *'( ) '( ) '( ) ( ) ( ) '( ) 0U x V G G x x V G x     . 
 
But, since *'( ) 0x  , *( )x 0  and *'( ) 0G x  , (8) requires that 
 
(9)                                      2
1 1'( ) '( ) 1 ( ) 0V G n G n G
G G
              , 
or 
 
 (10)                                     2
'( ) 1 1 1 1.
1( ) 11
n G
n G G G G
G
      
 . 
The solution of this differential equation yields the optimal market size as a function 
of G computed at *x .  
 
Proposition 2:  n*(G) = 
1
M G
G ,  where G= ( *)G x  and M is a constant of integration 
obtained from the solution of (10).  
 
The constant of integration M can be computed by substituting n=1 into the function 
n*(G). This will result in  M= 1
1
1 G
G
 , where 1G  is the profit share of a single producer 
at his desired output and 1G  implies that the optimal number of producers for the 
bureaucrat is 1. Note that, by Proposition 2, 1 11 1M M nG
n G G n n M
        . 
That is, from the bureaucrat's point of view, given the number of producers n, the 
optimal bureaucracy norm must satisfy  
 
(11)                                            *( ) nG n
n M
  . 
  9
 
In light of (6) and (7), Proposition 2 also implies that the maximum amount of 
resources extracted by the bureaucrat, maxU , is proportional to the maximum profit of 
every producer, max . That is, 
 
Corollary 2.1:     * * * *max max( ( ) , ( )U U n G x M x G x M    .  
 
Proposition 2 implies that the number of producers the bureaucrat chooses is 
positively related to G (recall that ( *))G G x . That is, if the bureaucracy norm 
becomes less expropriating (allows a smaller degree of producer exploitation in 
equilibrium), then the bureaucrat is induced to increase the number of producers. 
Corollary 2.2:  
*
0n
G
    or  
*
0
(1 )
n
G
   .  
 
Suppose that the norm allows larger extraction of resources from the producers in 
equilibrium (G= ( *)G x  is reduced). Could it be rational for the bureaucrat to 
extinguish the source of his "income" by causing a producer under his control to exit 
the market?  By Corollary 2.2, not only that it can be rational, such a policy is always 
rational for the bureaucrat. The fundamental inverse relationship between competition 
(represented by *n ) and the equilibrium profit share transferred to the bureaucrat 
(represented by 1- ( *)G x ) is thus guaranteed, whenever the bureaucrat controls the 
relationship between n and G.  
 
3.2. Variable output price 
Let us dismiss with the initial assumption that the output price is fixed and assume 
that the price of the good is inversely related to its (total) quantity. That is, the 
demand function is ( )p X , where '( ) 0p X  . Note that given that entry to the 
competitive industry is controlled by the bureaucrat, the prevailing price hinges on the 
number n set by the bureaucrat and on the output x chosen by the identical 
competitive price-taking producers. 
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 (i) The preferred market size cn   
Anticipating the equilibrium of the producers, the government official now chooses 
the  number of producers n and the price p, given G(x), c(x) and ( ) ( )p X p nx . Its 
problem is therefore: 
 
(12)                   
,
 
n p
Max    * * *, 1 ( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ( ))U n p n G x p p nx x p c x p     , 
 
where *( )x p is the supply function derived from the necessary condition for the 
solution of the problem of the competitive  produces who take the price p, which is 
determined by the bureaucrat, as given (see (2)). The solution of this problem is the 
selected market size cn  and price cp . The corresponding output produced by every 
producer is cx . To illustrate the determination of the number of producers cn  (in the 
proof we also derive the equilibrium price cp and the equilibrium output cx ), consider 
the case of a hyperbolic demand function, linear cost function and exponential 
bureaucracy norm. In this case we get:  
Proposition 3: If the demand function is ( ) ,
ap nx b
nx
   the cost function is 
( )c x cx d  , the bureaucracy norm is given by xe and 
0,  a>0, b>c, d>(b-c) , d+(b-c)<0  5 , then  
 ( ) . 
( )
c an d b c
d b c
     
 
The sensitivity of the equilibrium market size cn to the parameters of the demand, cost 
and institutional norm functions is directly obtained from Proposition 3.  
 
Corollary 3.1: cn is decreasing with  , b and (b-c) and  is increasing  with c and d. 
 
 Again, suppose that the prevailing norm allows larger extraction of resources 
from the producers ( is reduced, so G becomes smaller and (1-G) becomes larger, 
for any x) or the market situation becomes more favorable to the producer – the 
                                                 
5 The requirements regarding the parameters , , ,a b c  and d  ensure that the equilibrium number of 
producers, price and output are positive. 
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technology is improved (the fixed cost d or the marginal cost c is reduced) or the 
demand increases (the shift parameter b becomes larger). Could it be rational for the 
bureaucrat to give up the source of his "income" in the above cases by causing a 
producer under his control to exit the market?  By Corollary 3.1, the answer to these 
questions is unequivocal. Since there is an inverse relationship between the number of 
producers the bureaucrat selects and the parameter  , a decrease in  leads, as 
expected, to increased competition (n becomes larger). 6   Since there is a direct 
relationship between the number of producers and the parameters d and c, improved 
efficiency of the producers leads to reduced competition (n becomes smaller). Finally, 
since there is an inverse relationship between the number of producers chosen by the 
bureaucrat and the parameter b,  increased  demand also leads to reduced competition 
(n becomes smaller). An improvement in the market conditions of the producers (via 
the demand or cost functions) induces the bureaucrat to reduce their number. 
 Finally, Proposition 3 implies that the extracted profit share is quite 
substantial. It always exceeds 0.632. That is, 
 
Corollary 3.2: For any feasible combination of the parameters ,  ,  ,  a b c  and d  of 
the bureaucracy norm, demand and cost functions, 1 ( ) 0.632.cG x   
 
Note that although the bureaucrat controls both the number of producers and the 
output price, the fact that the producers are essentially competitive and the fact that 
the bureaucracy norm implies that the ability of the government official to extract 
resources from the producers is limited result in equilibrium net profits of the industry 
that can reach up to 0.36 of the competitive profits when entry to the industry cannot 
exceed n. 
 
(ii) The equilibrium market size en and price ep  
Suppose that, anticipating the equilibrium of the producers *x , the bureaucrat can 
choose the function ( ( *)n G x  that relates n to ( *)G x , given c(x) and ( ) ( )p X p nx . In 
this case, the price is determined by the bureaucrat who selects * *( ( )n G x , the 
                                                 
6 In this case, where the bureaucrat changes  n in response to a change in the prevailing norm parameter  , increased profit extraction always leads to more competition (a larger number of producers), in 
contrast to the situation in subsection 3.1. (II), where the bureaucrat controls the structural dependence 
between n and G(x), see footnote 3.  
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producers who choose their preferred output *( )x p  and the exogenous demand 
function ( )p nx .   Let us examine the determination of the equilibrium number of 
producers and equilibrium output price in this setting. 
 Proposition 2 and its corollaries are still valid when the fixed price p of the 
preceding sub-section is replaced by the demand function ( ) ( )p X p nx (To verify 
this claim, substitute ( )p nx instead of p in (4) and (5) to obtain, again, (6) – (10) and 
then proceed with the proof of Proposition 2). Substituting (11) in the more general 
form of (5), we get that the maximum gross profit of a producer is given by: 
 
(13)                            
*
* * * *
*
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )
x n Mp nx x c x x
G x n
         . 
Being aware of the dependence of the maximal profit of the producers and of his own 
maximal utility on n, x and the desired bureaucracy norm, the government official can 
derive the required relationship between the output price and nx.  Specifically, 
 
 
Proposition 4: The desirable price for the bureaucrat is 
* max
*( )
o Up nx b
nx
  , 
where b is a constant of integration ,  * *max ( ( )U U n G x and  n = * *( ( )n G x . 
 
Notice that since '( ) 0op nx  , ( )ob p  = minp  . The maximum price is obtained 
when n=1, so maxmax min*
Up p
x
   .  The desirable price for the bureaucrat can be 
expressed as a weighted average of the highest and lowest preferred prices. 
 
Corollary 4.1: The desirable price for the bureaucrat is a weighted average of 
maxp and minp . Specifically,  
*
max min
1 ( 1)( )o np nx p p
n n
   
 
Notice that *( )op nx depends on both n and x* because maxp depends on them.  
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          The equilibrium number of producers en , the equilibrium output of every 
producer ex and the equilibrium price ep are determined by the solution of the 
equilibrium conditions *'( ) 0x   , *'( ) 0U x   and the equality between the 
desirable price (the price that preserves the optimality conditions) and the demand 
function, *( )op nx = ( )p nx . In this extended setting then the equilibrium triple 
( , ,e e en p x ) is determined by a bureaucrat who anticipates the equilibrium behavior of 
the producers, taking into account the exogenous functional parameters namely, the 
demand function ( )p X , the cost function c(x) and the norm G(x). Again, since 
Corollary 2.2 is still valid, the inverse structural relationship between en  and (1-G(x)), 
that can be interpreted as the fundamental inverse relationship between the extent of 
competition and profit extraction is guaranteed. 
 
4. Summary and  concluding remarks  
We have demonstrated that the institutional norm is a useful explanatory concept for 
understanding the diversity in market structures in different societies. In our study, 
this norm is represented by the profit share producers are required to transfer to a 
bureaucrat in order to secure his approval to produce and/or sell any desired quantity 
of output. Market structure is characterized by the number of producers assuming that 
there is no collusion among the producers. 
In our setting, the industry size reflects the desire of the bureaucrat to 
maximize his share in the industry profits taking advantage of the existing 
bureaucracy norm and market characteristics. The number of firms is not determined 
by entry barriers due to collusion among the sellers, by the different efficiency levels 
of the producers, by some competitive ideology or by the political power of some 
interest group (sub-group of the producers).  
The proposed approach was illustrated by examining the determination of the 
number of competitive producers as a function of demand, supply and the prevailing 
bureaucracy norm: the function that relates the extent of production to the profit share 
that is transferred from the producers to the bureaucrat. Our study thus sheds light on 
the relationship between the equilibrium market structure (degree of competition) and 
the prevailing bureaucracy norm and on the relationship between the equilibrium 
 14
number of producers and the parameters of their cost function and of the demand 
function they face.  
We have started with the presentation of the producer's problem, given a 
particular bureaucracy norm and with the equilibrium analysis of the producer's 
problem that yields his optimal output. This analysis resulted in the characterization 
of viable norms; norms that ensure existence of equilibrium (Proposition 1). The 
study of institutional norms and market structure was then carried out assuming, first, 
that producers face a fixed price. Here we derived an explicit expression of the 
equilibrium number of producers set by the bureaucrat, dependent on whether he 
controls n or the relationship between n and the prevailing norm in equilibrium 
(Proposition 2). In the latter case, the bureaucrat is assumed to play a more central 
role: he can affect the underlying structural relationship between market size and the 
norm of bureaucracy costs. In other words, his status enables him to influence the 
norm not only by determining the number of producers, but by shaping the 
relationship between the norm and any number of producers. The effect of a change in 
the bureaucracy norm in equilibrium on the number of producers was clarified in 
Corollary 2.2. The relationship between the resources extracted by the bureaucrat and 
the maximal residual profit of the producer was presented in Corollary 2.1. Finally we 
examined the determination of market size and output price by the bureaucrat in the 
more general case of a variable price (negatively sloped demand function). Again, this 
has been done assuming that the bureaucrat controls n (Proposition 3 and its 
Corollaries 3.1 and 3.2) or the relationship between n and the prevailing bureaucracy 
norm.  (Proposition 4 and its Corollary 4.1). In both cases we have clarified how 
market structure (the equilibrium number of producers) is determined by a bureaucrat 
who takes into account the exogenous functional parameters; the demand 
function ( )p X , the cost function c(x) and the norm G(x).  
The institutional norm can be interpreted as the corruption norm of low-level 
government officials. That is, (1- ( ))G x can be interpreted as the characteristic pattern 
of this type of corruption. In our setting, such corruption is common knowledge and 
not secret as typically assumed in the corruption literature, Treisman (2000). Another 
difference is that in our setting the decision on the number of active price-taking firms 
in an industry is made by government officials and is not determined endogenously in 
a competitive rent-seeking model, as in Bliss and Di Tella (1997). Interpreting the 
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bureaucracy norm as the prevailing corruption pattern of low-level bureaucracy, the 
relationship between competition and corruption has been established in three cases. 
Under a fixed output price (a perfectly elastic demand), the degree of competition is 
invariant to corruption; the government official has an incentive to increase the 
number of producers as much as possible. Under a variable output price, increased 
corruption always leads to more competition (a larger number of producers). 
However, under a fixed or a variable output price, if the bureaucrat controls the 
structural relationship between the degree of competition (represented by n) and the 
profit share extracted from the producers (represented by the function (1-G(x)), then 
increased extraction rate always leads to less competition and vice versa, reduced 
competition leads to increased extraction of resources from the producers.7 These 
different conclusions vividly demonstrate that, under different circumstances, the 
same bureaucracy may truthfully declare that it is a determined and unconditional 
supporter of competition (as in the case where the output price is fixed) or that it 
supports increased competition when corruption increases (as in the case of a 
negatively sloped demand curve and no bureaucracy control on the structural 
relationship between market structure and the prevailing bureaucracy norm). But the 
basic truth is that, if the bureaucrats can control the structural relationship between 
market size and corruption, then they always ensure that there is an inverse 
relationship between market size and corruption; in particular, an increase in 
corruption is always associated with a decrease in competition (the number of 
producers). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 In the model applied by Ades and Di Tella (1999), the effect of competition on corruption is 
ambiguous. However, their empirical findings prove that less competition fosters corruption.  
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Appendix 
Proposition 1: A bureaucracy norm given by G(x) is viable, if it is constant or 
bounded from above by the hyperbolic function 
1 2
1( )G x
D x D
  , where 
1D and 2D  are constants of integration obtained from the solution of 
2
''( ) '( )2 0
( ) ( )
G x G x
G x G x
        
.                                             
Proof: 
By (1), 
 
(A1)                                                     ( )( )
( )
xpx c x
G x
    , 
 
Hence, the first order condition (2) is equivalent to: 
(A2)         
2
2
'( ) '( ) - '( ) ( ) - '( ) '( ) ( ) 
( )( )
G x G xp c x x p c x G x x
G xG x
          . 
By multiplying (A1) by ''( )G x , we get that: 
 
(A3)                                             ''( )( ) ''( ) ( )
( )
G xpx c x G x x
G x
   .      
 
To examine the required relationship between ( )G x  and ( )c x , let us substitute (A2) 
and (A3) in the second order condition (3) to obtain the combined condition (the first 
and second order conditions) for the maximization of ( )x : 
 
 (A4)                     
2
'( ) ''( )''( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( ) 0
( ) ( )
G x G xc x G x x x
G x G x
        ,                 
  
  or 
 
 (A5)                                                        ''( ) ( ) ( )c x x x    , 
 
 17
where 
 (A6)                                       
2
1 ''( ) '( )( ) 2
( ) ( ) ( )
G x G xx
G x G x G x
         
   . 
 
To examine inequality (A5), let us look at the solution of the non-
linear second order differential equation: 
 
 (A7)                                     
2
''( ) '( )( ) 2 0
( ) ( )
G x G xx
G x G x
          
 . 
 
Note that 
 
                                                1 22' '1 1 ' 'G G G GG G           , 
 
and  
 
                                              3 2
''1 2 ' ' ''G G G G G
G
            . 
 
Hence, 
 
                                             
2''1 1 '' '2G G
G G G G
                
( )x  . 
 
This implies that (A5) can be written as: 
 
                                                       
''1''( ) ( )c x x
G
      . 
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Solving the equality: ( )x = 
''1
G
    = 0, we get that G(x) is either a constant or: 
                       1
'1 D
G
       and - 1 2 1 2
1 1( )D x D G G x
G D x D
        , 
which means that G(x) is viable, if it is bounded from above by ( )G x . 
                                                                                                                    Q.E.D. 
 
Corollary 1.1: Any bureaucracy norm given by ( )
k
G x
x


     , where 1k   
and 11/ D   , is viable.  
Proof: 
Consider norms of the form: 
                           ( ) ( ) ( )     ;   (k>0, >0)
k
k kG x G x xk x
   
        . 
Then 
                 
2 2
1
2
' ''( ) ( )( )
( )
k k G k G kG x k x
G x G x
   
               , 
and 
                                  2 2
'' ( 1)'' ( 1)( )
( )
k k G k kG k k x
G k
  
         . 
Since                                   
2
''( ) '( )( ) 2
( ) ( )
G x G xx
G x G x
         
,  
                                 
2
2 2
( 1) 2 ( 1)( ) ( )     ;  (G>0)
( ) ( )
k k k k kx G x
x x
  
        . 
Hence, 
0,1 ( ) ( ) 0k x x       
1 ( ), ( ) 0k x x     
   19
That is, any norm given by ( )
k
G x
x


     , where 1k  and 1 1/D   , is 
viable. 
                                                                                                                 Q.E.D.                                           
 
Remark: Suppose that the bureaucracy norm is given by a function G(x) that  
is bounded from above by the hyperbolic function 
1 2
1( )G x
D x D
  ,  where 1D and 
2D  are constants of integration obtained from the solution of 
2
''( ) '( )2 0
( ) ( )
G x G x
G x G x
        
. Then the convexity of the cost function c(x) is a 
sufficient, but not a necessary second order condition for the maximization of the 
producer's problem. 
Proof:  
Since ( )x = 
' '1
G
    < 0, the optimality condition (A5) directly implies that the 
convexity of the cost function c(x) is a sufficient but not a necessary second order 
condition for the maximization of the producer's problem.  
                                                                                                                             Q.E.D.                      
 
Proposition 2:  n*(G) = 
1
M G
G ,  where G= ( *)G x  and M is a constant of integration 
obtained from the solution of (10). 
Proof: 
The solution of the bureaucrat's problem requires that 
 (10)                       2
'( ) 1 1 1 1.
1( ) 11
n G
n G G G G
G
      
 . 
or 
 
                                                     1 1 1
1
dn
n dG G G
     . 
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Hence, 
 
     .ln ln - ln  ( -1) ln  ln - ln(1- ) ln ln
1 1-
dn dG dG G Mn G G M G G M
n G G G
        . 
 
We therefore obtain that n*(G)=
1
M G
G , where M is the constant of integration 
obtained from the solution of (10). 
                                                                                                                              Q.E.D.                               
 
Corollary 2.1:    * * * *max max( ( ) , ( )U U n G x M x G x M     
Proof: 
Substituting n*(G)=
1
MG
G in (7) yields: 
1( ) ( ) GV G n G
G
     = 
(1 ) .
(1 )
M G G M
G G
   Hence, by (6), 
                                  * * * *
1( ( ( ))) ( ) ( )  ( )GU n G x n G x M x
G
      . 
                                                                                                                              Q.E.D. 
 
Corollary 2.2:  
*
0n
G
    or  
*
0
(1 )
n
G
   .  
Proof: 
This is directly obtained by differentiating n*(G) = 
1
M G
G  with respect to G: 
*
2( ) '( ) 0(1 )
Mn G
G
   . 
                                                                                                                              Q.E.D. 
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Proposition 3: If the demand function is ( ) ,
ap nx b
nx
   the cost function is 
( )c x cx d  , the bureaucracy norm is given by xe and 
0,  a>0, b>c, d>b-c , d+(b-c)<0   , then  
  c c( )( ) , p  and x . 
( ) ( ) ( )
c a db c b c dn d b c
d b c d b c b c
 
           
Proof: 
To derive *( )x p from the necessary condition for the solution of the problem of the 
competitive produces, let us substitute p,  ( )c x cx d   and G(x)= ( )c x cx d   in 
(2) to obtain: 
 
* * ( ) 0px cx d p c        , 
 
which yields: 
 
(A8)                               * 1( )   dx p
p c    or  
*
*( ) (1/ 2)
dp x c
x
  . 
 
Substituting ( )c x cx d   and ( ) ap nx b
nx
   in the objective function of the 
bureaucrat, we get: 
 
(A9)                                * * *, 1 ( ) ( ) ( )U n p n G x p nx x c x       
                                                    *1 ( )G x * *a bnx cnx dn       
                                                     *1 ( )G x *( )a b c nx dn     . 
 
A necessary condition for the maximization of   ,U n p is: 
 
(A10)                                ' * *1 ( ) ( ) 0nU G x b c x d       , 
 
which yields the equilibrium output cx : 
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(A11)                           c dx
b c
  . 
 
Substituting (A11) in (A8), we get :cp  
                        
(A12)                            c ( )p 1 ( )
d db c b ccd d b c
b c



     
  
 
Using ( ) ,
ap nx b
nx
  we get that  
 
(A13)                  
( )
c c
c c c c
a ap b n
n x p b x
     .  
 
Applying (A12), we find ( )cp b ,  
 
( )cp b =
2 2 2 2( 2 ) ( )db bc c b bc c b cb
d b c d b c d b c

  
             . 
 
Substituting ( )cp b  and cx (see (A11)) in (A13), we get the optimal number of 
producers cn :  
 
(A14)             ( )
( ) ( )
c
c c
a an d b c
p b x d b c
       
                                                                                                                              Q.E.D. 
 
 
Corollary 3.2: For any feasible combination of the parameters ,  ,  ,  a b c  and d  of 
the bureaucracy norm, demand and cost functions, 1 ( ) 0.632.cG x   
Proof: 
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Notice that, by assumption, d+(b-c)<0 , that is,  b c
d
   , which ensures that cn is 
positive. Since, by (A11), c dx
b c
  ,  
1
cx
   or  1.cx    This means that 
( )cG x = 1 0.368
cxe e    which establishes that 1 ( ) 0.632.cG x   
                                                                                                                              Q.E.D. 
 
Proposition 4: The desirable price for the bureaucrat is 
* max
*( )
o Up nx b
nx
   
where b is a constant of integration and  * *max ( ( )U U n G x . 
Proof: 
Recall that that the maximum gross profit of a producer is given by: 
 
(A15)                            
*
* * * *
*
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )
x n Mp nx x c x x
G x n
         . 
Differentiating (A15) with respect to n, we get that * * 2 * 2'( )( ) ( )
Mp nx x x
n
  , or: 
 
(A16)                                 * * * 2'( ) ( ) ( )
Mp nx x
nx
  < 0  . 
 
By Corollary 2.1,  
 
(A17)                                  * max* 2'( ) ( )
Up nx
nx
  .  
 
Integrating (A17) by the variable (nx*), we obtain that the bureaucrat's desired price 
as a function of  nx* is given by: 
 (A18)                                   * max*( )
o Up nx b
nx
  , 
where b is a constant of integration and  * *max ( ( )U U n G x . 
                                                                                                                            Q.E.D. 
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Corollary 4.1: The desirable price for the bureaucrat is a weighted average of 
maxp and minp . Specifically,  
*
max min
1 1( ) ( )o np nx p p
n n
   
Proof: 
Since maxmax min*
Up p
x
   and minp = b,   
* max
*( )
o Up nx b
nx
  = max min min1 ( )p p pn    max min
1 1(1 )p p
n n
  = max min1 1( )np pn n
  
 
                                                                                                                            Q.E.D. 
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